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MUTUALS: AN AREA OF LEGAL 
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ABSTRACT 
Underappreciated in its importance and often-misunderstood 
in its implications, the choice between a company limited by shares 
and a company organized as a mutual is an important decision in 
sectors ranging from agriculture to banking to insurance. Adding 
gravity to this particular decision is the difficulty and enormous 
cost of corporate metamorphosis between company types later in 
the company’s life. The authors examine the history of the mutual 
form, its popularity’s rise and fall during the twentieth century, and 
its advantages and disadvantages in today’s environment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The corporation limited by shares is among the most com-
mon corporate form in the Western world,1 and the one familiar 
to most attorneys, entrepreneurs, and investors.2 
 In that type of entity, a company is owned and controlled by 
the shareholders,3 who are permitted to buy shares from one another, 
or from others, or from the company itself. The owners of these shares 
have certain rights,4 such as the right to receive dividends,5 the right 
to vote on certain matters that affect the company,6 and the right to 
sell shares as they please to whom they please at a time of their 
choosing.7 But other corporate forms exist to serve other purposes.8 
 This Article discusses an ownership model not often discussed 
at law firms, in law schools, or even among law professors: the type 
of cooperative known as a “mutually held” company, or a “mutual.”9 
                                                                                                            
1 See generally DAVID KERSHAW, COMPANY LAW IN CONTEXT (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2d ed. 2012). 
2 As of this writing, the vast majority of corporations in America are either 
corporations limited by shares or corporations of a limited liability type (LLCs 
and their progeny) with member stakeholders; mutuals, the form discussed 
here, represent a minority of corporations and are often unfamiliar to laypeo-
ple. Conor Clarke & Wojciech Kopczuk, Business Income and Business Taxa-
tion in the United States Since the 1950s, 31 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 121, 129 (2017). 
3 See 2 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS § 848 (Callaghan & Co. 1917). 
4 See Alexander Hamilton Frey, The Distribution of Corporate Dividends, 
89 U. PA. L. REV. 735, 738 (1941). 
5 See, e.g., Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1256, 
1258 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
6 Press Release, SEC, SEC Votes to Seek Public Comment on U.S. Proxy 
System (Sept 14, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-122.htm 
[https://perma.cc/3N78-EK2N] (“The U.S. proxy system governs the way in 
which investors vote their shares in a public company regardless of whether 
they attend shareholder meetings.”). 
7 For an interesting commentary on how and when such rights are subject 
to restriction, see Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 141 N.E.2d 812, 814 (N.Y. 
1957). See generally UNIFORM LAWS, ANNOTATED, BOOK 6: UNIFORM STOCK 
TRANSFER ACT § 15 (H. Noyes Greene ed., 1922); accord. Costello v. Farrell, 48 
N.W.2d 557, 560 (Minn. 1951). 
8 See Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 
53 VA. L. REV. 259, 260, 278 (1967). 
9 “Mutual Company” in JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF 
FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS (Barrons 2014) (A mutual company is a “cor-
poration whose ownership and profits are distributed among members in pro-
portion to the amount of business they do with the company.”). 
 
600 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:597 
 
 The goal of this corporate form is to align the economic in-
terests of the company with the pecuniary interests of its custom-
ers and to remove incentives for the company to generate excess 
profits;10 this is achieved by returning excess profits to the customers 
according to their contributions to those profits.11 Early examples 
of cooperatives include associations that owned or controlled in-
frastructure and enjoyed natural monopolies, such as places to store 
agricultural commodities, docks used for commercial vessels, and 
so on.12 The form’s pedigree is Commonwealth British, and exam-
ples of mutuals exist in America as early as the pre-Constitutional 
Eighteenth Century.13 Its dominance as a form for life insurance 
companies in particular is likely Dutch14 or British15 in origin. 
 It is important to note that all corporate models are tem-
plates. In other words, the partnership, the corporation limited 
by shares, and the mutual are all organizations that groups of 
mercantile actors could establish from whole cloth of their own 
accord beginning with a pencil and a blank sheet of parchment.16 
                                                                                                            
10 Henry Hansmann, The Organization of Insurance Companies: Mutual 
Versus Stock, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 125, 126–27 (1985). 
11 For an exploration of why one might choose one form for a business entity 
rather than another, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW, chs. 1, 5 (1991). 
12 Peter Normark, A Role for Cooperatives in the Market Economy, 67 
ANNALS PUB. & COOPERATIVE ECON. 429, 430 (1996). 
13 For an interesting case of a mutual undergoing demutualization in an 
overseas context, see Old Mutual, Harvard Business School, Case No. 9-701-026 
(Harvard 2001) (on file with the authors). The oldest domestic mutual company 
was The Friendly Society for Mutual Insurance of Houses Against Fire in 
Charleston, S.C., founded in 1736; it was inadequately capitalized and diversi-
fied to survive a catastrophic loss and hence bankrupted by a wave of claims 
from The Great Fire of 1740 in its eponymous year. Matthew Mulcahy, The 
“Great Fire” of 1740 and the Politics of Disaster Relief in Colonial Charleston, 
99 S.C. HIST. MAG. 135–57 (1998). 
14 The Dutch contemplation of life insurance firms, or levensverzeker-
ingsmaatschappij, often simultaneously contemplates the mutual form as the 
form of these firms. Regulatory frameworks for life insurance in the Nether-
lands are also seemingly made with mutual forms in mind, though this form is 
not mandated by current law. See, e.g., Art. 7:975 BW (Neth.). 
15 See Old Mutual, supra note 13, at 5 (“The mutual life assurance structure 
was developed in the U.K. during the eighteenth century and was exported 
abroad during the nineteenth century.”). 
16 See Charles Baden-Fuller & Mary S. Morgan, Business Models as Models, 
43 LONG RANGE PLAN. 156, 159 (2010). 
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Corporate forms, including those discussed here, are types of en-
terprises that like-minded entrepreneurs might create if they 
could bargain with each other indefinitely at zero cost and engi-
neer every minute aspect of the business. Because people do not 
have this luxury in real life, corporate forms represent useful 
models with reasonable default rules that parties might arrive at 
after negotiation; these include provisions related to distribution 
of dividends, representation and governance, mechanisms for dis-
solution, and others.17 In the case of cooperatives and mutuals, 
we see a template for a company that is engineered with equality 
of stakeholders and fairness towards consumers as core values.18 
 In the cooperative model, often referred to as a “co-op,” a 
group of people voluntarily agree to form an organization for the 
purpose of providing a service while, at the same time (through 
formal or informal governance mechanisms), ensuring the service 
is operated for the benefit of its users (i.e., customers).19 Excess 
profits are distributed to users in a payment that may be charac-
terized in a number of ways, such as dividends or credit.20 It is 
important to note that, while customers in other areas of the economy 
may also be stakeholders (a buyer of a Ford car may or may not own 
Ford Motor Co. shares), the co-op is unusual in that the transac-
tion itself creates the ownership interest.21 Co-ops have been 
                                                                                                            
17 See Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Own-
ership: Causes and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155, 1156, 1158 (1985). 
18 For an explanation of why self-interested, rational economic actors might 
participate in such a structure, see Johnston Birchall & Richard Simmons, 
What Motivates Members to Participate in Co-operative and Mutual Businesses?: 
A Theoretical Model and Some Findings, 75 ANNALS PUB. & COOPERATIVE 
ECON. 465, 470–71 (2004). 
19 Jim Crandall, Using the Cooperative Business Model as an Economic De-
velopment Tool, CORNHUSKER ECON. (Aug. 28, 2014), https://agecon.unl.edu 
/cornhusker-economics/2014/using-the-cooperative-business-model-as-an-eco 
nomic-development-tool [https://perma.cc/S32D-PHLH]. 
20 See Margaret Lund, Cooperatives Equity and Ownership: An Introduction, 
U. WIS. CTR. COOPERATIVES at 7, 26–27 (Apr. 2013). It is neither particularly 
important, nor legally dispositive, whether the amount involved is called an “ex-
cess,” a “dividend,” a “benefit,” or a “membership payment.” Other terms are also 
used and, in some cases, charges pending in the current period (for instance, 
insurance premia) are simply adjusted to account for the amount. 
21 Id. at 6–7. 
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formed to serve a diverse set of community needs from residential 
property management companies to taxicab associations, to burial 
and funeral societies, to grocery stores.22 In an era before Airbnb, 
Uber, Zipcar, and other startups now familiar to us, co-ops of various 
sorts were the primary structure through which assets or re-
sources would be shared among a group of otherwise unac-
quainted consumers.23 
 A mutual is a specific kind of cooperative model. While a 
co-op may simply favor its customers, the favoritism need not be 
in proportion to the customer’s economic activity with the com-
pany.24 For instance, it is not unusual for a co-op feed store in a 
rural community to only allow members to shop there.25 A mem-
bership might cost $1,000 and come with one share in the com-
pany, but this policy might be waived for farmers who spend at 
least $750 in a transaction, live in the county, and receive two 
shares; a further rule might specify that only members with even 
numbers of shares can run for the board of the co-op in annual 
elections.26 These kinds of arbitrary rules are especially common 
in rural cooperative settings where certain characteristics (local 
ownership or local governance, for instance) are valued more than 
revenue maximization.27 
 Mutual companies typically have more precise rules than 
traditional cooperatives; these govern in what proportion and 
through what mechanisms the customers own and control the com-
pany.28 For instance, in the case of an insurer, the amount of pre-
mium (often determined by a customer lifetime value calculation) 
                                                                                                            
22 See Sonja Novkovic, Defining the Co-operative Difference, 37 J. SOCIO-ECONS. 
2168, 2175 (2008). 
23 Id. at 2174. 
24 University of California Small Farm Program, What is a Cooperative? (last 
updated May 22, 2012), http://sfp.ucdavis.edu/cooperatives/what_is/ [https:// 
perma.cc/2YBQ-UVNN]. 
25 Id. 
26 See, e.g., Bylaws of Cooperative Corporation Mohawk Harvest Coopera-
tive Market, MOHAWK HARVEST, arts. 2.1–2.2, 5.6, 6.1–6.6, http://www.mo 
hawkharvest.org/assets/Mohawk_Harvest%20_ByLaws.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/5875-JL6Z]. 
27 See, e.g., id. at art. 1.2. 
28 This is in part due to the regulatory environment in which mutuals oper-
ate. See, e.g., Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lederer, 252 U.S. 523, 526 (1920) 
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is often used to determine a mutual customer’s “stake” in the com-
pany.29 Whereas ownership and associated rights in stock companies 
are determined based on the purchase, vesting, or grant of a set 
of units, ownership and attendant rights in mutual companies are 
determined by other measures having to do with the consumption 
of the company’s services (e.g., premium paid, grain stored, trades 
completed, etc.).30 
 Mutual companies are particularly common in the insur-
ance industry and were more common historically in the savings-
and-loan industry (pre-1980s) and among community banks 
(pre-1970s).31 Many familiar institutions that today take different 
forms (e.g., stock and commodities exchanges in the US are less 
likely than ever before to be organized as mutual companies) were 
once mutually owned, while farm cooperatives, town granaries, 
rural pharmacies,32 regional life insurers, and community health 
systems have been the least interested in transforming into other 
types of entities.33 
                                                                                                            
(referencing Revenue Act of October 3, 1913, c. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 172, 173 as to 
the way in which premium returned as a dividend might be treated or not 
treated as income). 
29 “Policy holders are the nominal owners of mutual insurance companies, 
and mutual insurers that change to ownership by equity investors offer stock 
to policyholders as part of the process; free or discounted stock cashes out the 
value of the policyholders’ ownership interest in the insurer’s ... assets.” RLJCS 
Enters. v. Prof. Benefit Tr., 487 F.3d 494, 495 (7th Cir. 2007) (Easterbrook, C.J.). 
30 See Lund, supra note 20, at 6–7. 
31 Hansmann, supra note 10, at 135. 
32 Pharmacies are a rare case where some argue the incentive alignment 
produced by the mutual form is both modern and desirable, especially in a time 
of rising healthcare and pharmaceutical costs. Mutual Drug Company of North 
Carolina is an example of a pharmaceutical wholesale business owned by its 
customers. Colorado was among the first states to recognize pharmacies as a 
valid use for the mutual form, with Schlotz Mutual Drug Co. appearing in the 
Colorado State Board of Pharmacy directory in 1922; few mutual pharmacies 
survived the post-WWII consolidation trend in pharmacies and the growth of 
national brands. See COLORADO STATE BOARD OF PHARMACY, TWENTY-NINTH 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE STATE BOARD OF PHARMACY OF COLORADO FOR THE 
YEAR ENDING JULY 2, 1922, ST. BOARD PHARMACY 39 (1922) (showing Schlotz 
Mutual Drug Co.’s presence in nine locations in and around Denver). 
33 “[D]emutualization [is] [t]he conversion of a mutual society into a corporate 
entity.” PETER MOLES & NICHOLAS TERRY, THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL TERMS 156 (1997). 
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Above: Tobacco storage for farmers in Viroqua, Wisconsin owned 
by a traditional mutual company.34 
 
 Mutual companies are further divided into two types: tra-
ditional mutuals and mutual holding companies.35 Traditional 
mutuals are designed for high levels of service with optimal in-
centive alignment between consumers and the company; this comes 
at the expense of access to capital and strategic or managerial 
                                                                                                            
34 See U.S. Dep’t of Interior, National Park Service, National Register of 
Historic Places, Registration Form for Northern Wisconsin Co-op Tobacco Pool 
Warehouse (Sept. 30, 2003); see also Kelly Slentz, Into the Driftless—Growing 
Tobacco (Part Two), ROOTSTOCK (Jan. 5, 2015), https://www.rootstock.coop 
/cropp-culture/into-the-driftless-growing-tobacco-part-two-3/ [https://perma.cc 
/3AVP-RR2K]. Photo taken in 2017 by the author, K. Muth. 
35 Fabio R. Chaddad & Michael L. Cook, Understanding New Cooperative 
Models: An Ownership-Control Rights Typology, 26 REV. AGRIC. ECON. 348, 351 
(2004). 
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flexibility.36 However, members of the mutual are willing to subject 
the company to these constraints, as they enjoy both the increased 
performance of the company (in terms of customer service or prod-
uct innovation, for instance) and economic benefits.37 Mutual 
holding companies were designed to have many of the benefits of 
a traditional mutual while also allowing the company a greater 
degree of flexibility to engage in mergers-and-acquisitions activ-
ity outside the firm’s traditional industry or to access capital more 
easily (and on better terms).38 When a mutual wishes to abandon 
the mutual form, it engages in a process known as “demutualiza-
tion.”39 Demutualization can (confusingly) refer to either the con-
version of a traditional mutual into a mutual holding company or 
the transformation of a traditional mutual into a stock company 
limited by shares;40 both transitions are discussed here. In the 
post-WWII era, demutualization has become something of a trend 
among traditional mutual companies seeking to restructure 
themselves away from the traditional mutual model.41 
 This Article examines which changes in the understanding of 
firm incentives and economics, changes in legislation or regulation, 
                                                                                                            
36 It is difficult for a mutual to explore entering a new line of business, for 
instance, because these customers will upset the balance of revenues that pro-
duce the stakeholdership calculation for the mutual. Consider, for instance, a 
mutually owned health insurer that opens a hospital; while the revenues and 
stakes in the insurance business are relatively predictable (customers are 
known, premium amounts are predictable), the mutual stakeholdership impli-
cations from hospital revenues are much less obvious and very unpredictable. 
See John Haydon & Robin Swindell, Special Report?Diversification Challenges 
and Opportunities for Mutuals, WILLIS RE, http://www.willisre.com/docu 
ments/Media_Room/Publication/Diversification_Challenges_and_Opportunities 
_for_Mutuals.pdf [https://perma.cc/VLB4-RN4M]. 
37 Kimberly M. Inman, Comment, The Mutual Holding Company: A New Op-
portunity For Mutual Insurance Companies?, 42 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 677, 679 (1998). 
38 Id. at 682, 692 n.172. 
39 See RLJCS Enters. v. Prof. Benefit Tr., 487 F.3d 494, 495–97 (7th Cir. 
2007) (Easterbrook, C.J.). 
40 See In re MetLife Demutualization Litig., 495 F. Supp. 2d 310, 311 
(E.D.N.Y. 2007); see also In re MetLife Demutualization Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 
267, 268 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); In re MetLife Demutualization Litig., 156 F. Supp. 
2d 254, 258–60 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (detailing the underlying fact pattern). 
41 Note, Developing a Demutualization Acquisition Strategy for Private Eq-
uity Firms, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1906, 1910 (1997). 
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and changes in market expectations may have caused the mutual 
form to fall out of favor during the past several decades.42 
 To better understand which corporations this Article’s anal-
ysis addresses, see Figure 1 below. 
 
Fig. 1: A Simplified Taxonomy of Companies by Owner-
ship or Control Mechanism43 
 ? Companies ? Corporations ? Companies Established by Participating Members ? Traditional LLCs ? Member-Managed Corporations of Various Types ? Merchant Companies (Commonwealth) ? Companies Limited By Shares ? Companies with Public Offerings ? Companies with Limited Offerings ? Companies with Equity Traded on 
  Coupons/Tickets ? Companies with Equity Traded on Ledger ? Companies Limited By Guarantee (No Shares or  
Dividends) ? Universities ? Public Charities ? Municipalities ? Professional Partnership Forms ? Companies Established by Royal Charter 
 (Commonwealth) ? Partnerships ? Traditional (at Common Law) Partnerships ? De Facto Partnerships Among Proprietors ? LLPs and Limited-Liability Forms ? Professional Partnership Forms ?  Special-Purpose Investment Vehicles ? Other Partnership Models 
                                                                                                            
42 Gregory N. Racz, Note, No Longer Your Piece of the Rock: The Silent Reor-
ganization of Mutual Life Insurance Firms, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 999, 1002–03 (1998). 
43 This is an intentionally incomplete taxonomy. It is not meant to be exhaustive; 
instead, it is meant to portray the space mutual companies and mutual benefit 
organizations occupy relative to other types of companies. See Standard Taxono-
mies, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/edgartaxonomies.shtml [https://perma 
.cc/HCB5-QH95] (listing numerous examples of complete taxonomies). 
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? Cooperative Models ? Traditional Cooperatives ?  Customer-Owned Grocery Stores ?  Granaries and Foodstuffs Storage ?  Farm Implement Lend-Lease Associations ? Mutual Companies ?  Traditional Mutuals ? Stock Exchanges ? Commodity Brokerage Associations ? Savings-and-Loan Associations ? Insurers of Various Types (Life, Property & 
Casualty, etc.) ? Mutual Holding Companies ? Insurance Companies ? Banks and Investment Management  
Companies ? Diversified Holding Companies of Various 
Kinds 
I.  TO MUTUAL OR NOT TO MUTUAL: THAT IS THE QUESTION 
 Assuming, ceteris paribus, actors prefer structures that are 
expected to maximize operational efficiency, access to capital, and 
returns to stakeholders,44 the mutual form is not an obvious choice 
when creating an entity. It is less appealing in terms of flexibility 
than stock companies when considering that the process of demu-
tualization is financially demanding and procedurally nontriv-
ial.45 The mutual form, with the exception of some industries 
where special protections exist, is not particularly tax-efficient ei-
ther, and accounting for small stakes held by a large number of 
customers can be administratively burdensome.46 
                                                                                                            
44 See generally Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Organizational Forms 
and Investment Decisions, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 101 (1985). 
45 See Racz, supra note 42, at 1005. 
46 For an example of how complex these calculations can be, consider the 
following: 
When the companies demutualized, policyholders [ ] therefore 
retained their policies and continued to pay the same premi-
ums. They no longer, however, held mutual rights, and there-
fore could not vote on corporate decisions and had no interest 
in the surpluses of the new companies. In exchange for the lost 
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Fig. 2: Comparison of Interest Alignment, Access to 
Capital Among Example Corporation Types 
 
 
 
So why are there any mutuals at all? The popularity of mutuals per-
sisted, with varying levels of enthusiasm, from 1870 to 1970.47 This 
was followed by a trend away from mutuals, which can be thought of 
as the prevailing trend in the period from 1970 to present. Under-
standing these two opposite phenomena requires understanding 
how incentives affect corporate structural decisions.48 
                                                                                                            
mutual rights, the companies provided policyholders with the op-
tion of receiving stock in the new companies or receiving a cash 
payment in lieu of stock. When determining how much stock to 
give policyholders, the companies calculated a “fixed” component to 
correspond to policyholders’ loss of voting rights, and a “vari-
able” component designed to measure “the policyholders’ contri-
bution to the surplus of the company.” Although the companies 
used slightly different methods to measure their policyholders’ 
contribution to the company’s surplus, all obtained independent 
actuarial opinions that the methods were “fair and equitable.” 
Dorrance v. U.S., 877 F. Supp. 2d 827, 830 (D. Ariz. 2012) (internal citations 
omitted). 
47 See Lisa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking and Insurance: Before 
and After Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 25 J. CORP. L. 723, 727–38 (2000). 
48 Update on Mutual Holding Companies, New York Annual Meeting, SOC’Y 
ACTUARIES, 24 RECORD 1, 10–11 (Oct. 1998). 
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 General America, an insurer, is one example of a company 
that has followed these major trends. General America began as 
a stock company and continued that way until 1946, when it be-
came a mutual.49 In 1997, the company began the demutualiza-
tion process and eventually (in that same year) became a mutual 
holding company (GenAmerica Corporation is the intermediate stock 
holding company that may be familiar to readers of this Article).50 
 More than a matter of fashion, firms gravitate toward cer-
tain corporate forms and not others for a variety of reasons and, in 
this case, these forces are chiefly economic rather than regulatory.51 
 The decision to create a mutual company is a hefty one and 
normally made with significant planning and discussion of alter-
natives. Similarly, the conversion from a mutual company to a 
mutual holding company or traditional stock company should be 
viewed as a serious decision that is difficult, though not impossible, 
to reverse.52 As one contemplates the waves of demutualization 
experienced in various industries, considering the prevalence of 
these transformations during historical periods is informative.53 
 In 1975, more than two thirds of savings-and-loan (S&L) as-
sets in the United States were held and managed by cooperative 
organizations of some type, the vast majority of those having been 
organized as mutual companies.54 Between 1975 and 1989, over 750 
mutuals converted to stock associations, and by 1990 less than a 
quarter of S&L assets55 were held by mutuals.56 A generation later, 
the insurance industry is witnessing a similar shift.57 
                                                                                                            
49 Id. at 10. 
50 Id. at 11. 
51 Id. at 10. 
52 Id. at 6–7. 
53 Stephanie O. Crofton, Luis G. Dopico & James A. Wilcox, Conversions 
and Capital of Mutual Thrifts: Connections, Problems, and Proposals for Credit 
Unions, 30 ESSAYS ECON. & BUS. HIST. 31, 34, 36–37 (2012). 
54 See U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of 
the United States, Table 788 (97th ed. 1976). 
55 Among other things, this was influenced by Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board rules that protected post-conversion companies from hostile takeover, one 
of many examples of the legislative or regulatory environment’s effect on the desir-
ability of conversion. See Crofton, Dopico & Wilcox, supra note 53, at 34, 36–37. 
56 See A Unified Federal Charter for Banks and Saving Associations: A Staff 
Study, 10 FDIC: BANKING REV. 1, 11 (1997). 
57 Mutual life insurance juggernauts John Hancock, MetLife, and Pruden-
tial demutualized and converted into stock companies with IPOs greater than 
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 The prime rationale (theoretically and practically) for mu-
tual enterprises to demutualize (either becoming a mutual holding 
company or a stock company) is to gain access to capital on better 
terms.58 However, other considerations contribute to the decision 
to demutualize and the subsequent increased firm performance 
that often results.59 For instance, the mutual structure and the mu-
tual form is generally tax-inefficient, which has been considered a 
constraint to growth.60 In particular, because mutuals cannot gener-
ally merge successfully with traditional stock companies without 
compromising their structures, mutuals have traditionally only 
had very limited opportunities to pursue mergers-and-acquisitions 
transactions and have been even less attractive as targets.61 This 
may explain why, in the case of insurers, companies tend to acquire 
or enter riskier lines of business (or noninsurance businesses) follow-
ing a demutualization but have difficulty finding allies or partners 
with whom to make similar maneuvers prior to demutualization.62 
II. TWO FLAVORS OF MUTUALS 
 The traditional mutual company and the mutual holding 
company are similar yet different. While both are very different 
from a traditional company limited by shares, legal scholars, 
in-house counsel, and the customers of mutually held companies 
often underestimate the difference between the two forms.63 
                                                                                                            
$1 billion in the 1990s, having substantial market effects on how the life insur-
ance industry is organized. While over half of life insurance policies by policy 
value were represented by mutual companies in 1986, that portion had de-
creased to only 15 percent fifteen years later (2001). See Lorraine Gorski, Life 
in the Public Eye: Newly Demutualized Life Insurers Adjust to the Glare of 
Shareholder Scrutiny, BEST’S REV. 22–29 (Nov. 2002). 
58 See Update on Mutual Holding Companies, supra note 48, at 12. 
59 See Gordon O. Pehrson, Jr., David R. Woodward, & James H. Mann, De-
mutualization of Insurance Companies: A Comparative Analysis of Issues and 
Techniques, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 709, 736–37 (1991–92). 
60 James M. Carson, Mark D. Forster, & Michael J. McNamara, Changes in 
Ownership Structure: Theory and Evidence from Life Insurer Demutualiza-
tions, 21 J. INS. ISSUES 1, 15 (1998). 
61 See James A. Smallenberger, Restructuring Mutual Life Insurance Compa-
nies: A Practical Guide Through the Process, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 513, 519–20 (2001). 
62 Id. at 519. 
63 See generally Marianne Bonner, Stock Insurer Versus Mutual Insurer, 
BALANCE (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.thebalance.com/stock-insurer-versus-mu 
tual-insurer-462504 [https://perma.cc/FPB7-4699]. 
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 First, it is important to establish that not all states allow, 
and even fewer encourage, both mutual forms.64 States like Wis-
consin have traditionally had both kinds of mutual companies.65 
The state has an especially rich history of dairy and other agricul-
tural cooperatives using these forms.66 Meanwhile, states in New 
England (like Massachusetts) have regulatory frameworks that 
clearly favor traditional mutuals while allowing, but not favoring, 
mutual holding company forms.67 Western states, like California and 
Montana, also have regulatory postures that allow mutuals, but tend 
to be less specific as to mutual holding companies.68 Nebraska is 
the most restrictive of the states that allow mutual holding com-
panies, mandating that each mutual holding company have only 
one subsidiary.69 Other states have special rules regarding demu-
tualization, but these go beyond the scope of this Article.70 
The advantage of a mutual holding company over a tradi-
tional mutual relates to the mutual holding company’s access to 
capital markets and its ability to raise capital from outside parties 
on better terms.71 This is accomplished by setting up a holding 
                                                                                                            
64 As of this writing, mutual holding company forms, or other forms that 
behave and are structured like mutual holding companies, are allowed by statute 
in California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Nebraska, 
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin. The 
District of Columbia also offers a mutual holding company form. See Update on Mu-
tual Holding Companies, supra note 48, at 4–5; see also Inman, supra note 37, 
at 684, 684 n.68. 
65 See Wisconsin Office of the Commissioner of Insurance, Comparison of 
Wisconsin and Iowa Insurance Regulation, WISCONSIN.GOV, https://oci.wi.gov 
/Documents/Companies/FinCunaCMISCompIAWI-200701.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/Z29T-6W2P]. 
66 See Greg Lawless, Humble Beginnings, U. WIS. CTR. COOPERATIVES, Bul-
letin No. 2, at 1–3 (Aug. 2002), http://www.uwcc.wisc.edu/pdf/Bulletins/bulle 
tin_08_02.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6DA-FJVX]. 
67 See Worcester Bus. J., Depositor-owned banks in Mass. angling to go pub-
lic, WBJOURNAL (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.wbjournal.com/article/20140331 
/PRINTEDITION/303279998/depositor-owned-banks-in-mass-angling-to-go-pub 
lic [https://perma.cc/QP33-FEL2]. 
68 See CAL. INS. CODE § 4097.01(m)(1)–(3) (1998); see also MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 33-3-216 (2009). 
69 See Update on Mutual Holding Companies, supra note 48, at 9. 
70 Iowa, for instance, has special rules that distinguish mutuals that will 
have an initial public offering of a stock company (an “IPO”) from ones that 
will not. See Update on Mutual Holding Companies, supra note 48, at 4. 
71 Id. at 6. 
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company (as the name suggests) which owns fifty-one percent72 
(or more) of the equity in the operating company. The remainder 
of the equity can be used as consideration in public or private 
transactions involving noncustomer investors (these include the 
sale of equity, the use of equity as collateral in transactions, or 
the use of equity to purchase other entities).73 The company can 
also, of course, simply sell stock to noncustomers either in an IPO 
or through private auctions.74 Following the demutualization of 
American Family Insurance, the company released press materi-
als explaining this new possibility: “While a mutual holding com-
pany structure would allow American Family to consider the sale 
of stock to raise capital, it has no plans do so.”75 By contrast, a 
traditional mutual cannot raise money in this way because its eq-
uity is “locked up” and owned by its customers, whose shares are 
tied to the consumption of the company’s goods and services and 
who do not have the right to buy or sell their shares76 (in the case 
of an agricultural mutual, the farmers transacting in commodi-
ties; in the case of an insurance company, the policyholders enjoy-
ing the protection of the insurance products the company offers).77 
Central documents of a traditional mutual generally not only avoid 
granting equity to noncustomers, but also prohibit noncustomer 
ownership of equity.78 It is important to recognize that the hold-
ing company layer of the mutual holding company is not in the 
                                                                                                            
72 In some states, 50.1 percent. Id. at 3. 
73 See id. at 12. 
74 The direct sale of shares is somewhat uncommon in the case of a mutual 
holding company conversion, but a substantially more common feature of full 
demutualizations. Sales of voting stock to noncustomers (non-policyholders in 
the insurance context) after a mutual holding company conversion generally 
require approval of the mutual holding company board and may also require 
approval of the relevant regulatory bodies. See id. at 3. 
75 Policyholders approve American Family’s Plan for organizational struc-
ture change, AM. FAM. INS. (Dec. 7, 2016), http://newsroom.amfam.com/12-7-16 
-mhc-conversion-vote/ [https://perma.cc/B3RC-SHBF]. 
76 Capital Markets Special Report, NAT’L ASS’N. INS. COMMISSIONERS, http:// 
www.naic.org/capital_markets_archive/150428.htm [https://perma.cc/E9UZ-5B2F]. 
77 See Andrew Beattie, A Primer for Investing in Agriculture, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/basics/12/agriculture-primer.asp [https:// 
perma.cc/FD5Y-E26X] (showing that a farmer’s produce is his commodity); see 
also Capital Markets Special Report, supra note 76. 
78 See Lund, supra note 20, at 4. Note that this does not include past customers. 
In other words, if Company A is a traditional mutual life insurer and a customer 
was, for a time but not currently, a customer of Company A, that customer may have 
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business of its subsidiaries or partner companies; it is a holding 
company, not an insurance company, for instance.79 
 From a legal perspective, the best way to think about the 
difference between a traditional mutual and a mutual holding 
company is to think of a shareholder’s bundle of rights.80 These 
rights fall into two groups: governance rights and operating rights.81 
The governance rights relate to how the stakeholder gives his or 
her input on how the company is run, such as voting in board 
elections. The operating rights pertain to how the stakeholder in-
teracts with the company as a customer, such as access to a grain 
shed to store excess grain produced on one’s farm82 or ability to 
force the mutual to pay beneficiaries upon the death of an in-
sured.83 Figure 3 shows examples of differentiated rights. 
 
Fig. 3: A List84 of Rights Mutual Stakeholders Enjoy, 
Segregated into Two Categories 
? Governance Rights ? The right to cast a vote for who is a director of 
the mutual ? The right to cast a vote for demutualization ? The right to cast a vote approving or disapproving 
of a merger 
                                                                                                            
remaining equity (and even voting) rights as to the mutual company despite 
not having a current policyholder relationship to Company A. See id. at 31–33. 
79 In many states, including California, Illinois, New York, and others, the 
holding company layer, though a general-purpose separate entity, is regulated 
as an insurance company and subject to the inquiries and decisions of insurance 
regulators. This is not true in all states. Stephen J. Olsen, Chuck vs. Goliath: 
Basis of Stock Received in Demutualization of Mutual Insurance Companies, 9 
HOUS. BUS. & TAX J. 360, 366 (2009). 
80 See Update on Mutual Holding Companies, supra note 48, at 3. 
81 See id. 
82 In the case of an agricultural cooperative structured as a mutual. See 
Marc Schneiberg, Toward an Organizationally Diverse American Capitalism? 
Cooperative, Mutual, and Local, State-Owned Enterprise, 34 SEATTLE U.L. 
REV. 1409, 1423 (2011). 
83 In the case of a mutual life insurance company. See Update on Mutual 
Holding Companies, supra note 48, at 3. 
84 This list is incomplete and for illustrative purposes only. In the case of a 
commodities exchange, for instance, a stakeholder customer might have hun-
dreds of transactional operating rights. See Smallenberger, supra note 61, at 
584–85; see also Update on Mutual Holding Companies, supra note 48, at 3. 
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? Operating Rights ? The right to make a claim as the holder of an 
insurance policy ? The right to cause a redemption or pay-on-demand 
event in a commodity market ? The right to force a clear-or-fail decision as to a 
trade on a stock market 
 In a traditional mutual, the customer stakeholder holds 
the whole bundle of rights; the governance and operating rights 
run together.85 In fact, even if the stakeholder desires it, the 
stakeholder cannot split the rights and sell them separately or 
dispose of them as he or she pleases.86 
 Conversely, in the case of a mutual holding company, the 
rights exist separately. The governance rights sit in the mutual 
holding company, while the operating rights are enjoyed by the 
stakeholder.87 In other words, the mutual holding company holds 
the majority of votes at all times in its subsidiary operating company, 
but customers still enjoy the operating rights they would have en-
joyed in a traditional mutual relationship, whether the company is 
an exchange operating company, an insurer, or something else.88 
III.  THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE DECISION 
 Once a company establishes that the mutual form it desires 
to take is legally viable in the jurisdiction of its incorporation, the 
company customarily engages in some form of economic analysis 
to determine the impact of such a decision.89 
 In the case of a mutual holding company, the economics are 
often as much related to the time involved as to the money in-
volved. Mutual holding company conversions, now that they are 
a well-understood transformation and can be planned to a great 
extent ahead of time, can be completed in as little as nine or ten 
months.90 The costs of a mutual holding company transformation 
                                                                                                            
85 U.N. CONF. TRADE & DEV., DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS OF COMMODITY EX-
CHANGES IN EMERGING MARKETS 21, 195 (2009). 
86 See Smallenberger, supra note 61, at 585. 
87 Id. at 580. 
88 Id. at 586. 
89 See generally Update on Mutual Holding Companies, supra note 48. 
90 Id. at 5, 12. 
 
2018] MUTUALS: AREA OF LEGAL CLIMATE CHANGE 615 
 
are lower not only because of savings on professional fees in the 
(much) shorter transformation period, but also because the interim 
accounting is far less complex.91 In a traditional demutualization, 
the company must do (in some cases decades of) comprehensive 
accounting of all revenues, their sources, and the equivalent 
shareholder positions represented by these contributions to firm 
revenue.92 Unsurprisingly, in some cases these records are not 
well kept or not up-to-date or are kept in a variety of analog and 
digital forms. 
 A firm transitioning to the mutual holding company form 
also needs less spare capital during the transaction period be-
cause there is no threat of a hostile takeover (since the mutual 
holding company always owns a majority of shares) during what 
would otherwise be a period of transition, cash scarcity, and man-
agerial transition; an ideal time for a takeover to occur.93 On the 
other hand, a company undertaking a traditional demutualiza-
tion and becoming a stock company has all of these disadvantages 
from an economic perspective; it absorbs tremendous costs during 
a lengthy transition period and is vulnerable to hostile parties ac-
cumulating substantial or even majority (in the case of an IPO, in 
particular) positions and forcing decisions that are unpopular 
among management, customers, or both.94 
 The economics of switching between the forms can be in-
timidating, even for well-managed companies with substantial 
cash reserves.95 While some of the costs of a full demutualization 
are offset by the proceeds of an IPO and some of the costs of the 
mutual holding company’s reorganization are offset by the ability 
to issue up to forty-nine percent of the voting stock in the enter-
prise to other parties (through private or public sales), these are 
downstream sources of capital not available at the time the de-
mutualization begins.96 
                                                                                                            
91 Id. at 5, 13. 
92 See Smallenberger, supra note 61, at 542. 
93 See Update on Mutual Holding Companies, supra note 48, at 12. 
94 Glenn S. Daily, Mutual Life Insurance Company Reorganizations: An Over-
view, GLENNDAILY, http://www.glenndaily.com/mhcoverview.htm#Q10 [https:// 
perma.cc/HNP2-HK9W]. 
95 See Olsen, supra note 79, at 368–69. 
96 See Smallenberger, supra note 61, at 526, 530; Update on Mutual Holding 
Companies, supra note 48, at 12. 
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 While some argue the tax savings of changing between 
structures may represent a substantial savings (the Section 809 
advantages of a life insurance mutual becoming a stock company, 
for instance, or the accounting for tax-exempt interest in that 
same case),97 these savings generally are not—at least in any one 
year—significant when compared to the cost of reorganizing a 
company of substantial size.98 In general, only companies with 
strong affiliations with private equity firms or outside investors 
will be able to raise the cash for a mutualization, which is essen-
tially a wholesale buyback and looks very much like a take-private 
transaction.99 In a mutualization, one of two things happens: a 
mutual holding company reverts (along with its subsidiaries) to 
being a traditional mutual, or the equity of a company limited by 
shares is gathered and surrendered into a container having the 
mutual form.100 
 Companies with an interest in protecting themselves from 
takeover and owning operating companies that are not in their 
traditional industries (an insurance company interested in owning 
financial services companies, for instance) will choose the mutual 
holding company structure.101 The economic incentives to engage 
in a traditional, full demutualization and become a stock company 
will be compelling for many reasons: substantial financial re-
wards to management and increased flexibility in future capital 
is raised.102 However, the consequences of the restructuring trans-
action itself are material and the company may be cash-poor or 
                                                                                                            
97 See IRS Rev. Rul. 99-3, 1999-3 I.R.B. 313 (affecting interpretation and 
implications of Internal Rev. Code §§ 808(c)(2), 809). 
98 See Daily, supra note 94. 
99 Mutualization is dramatically harder to fund than demutualization, as it 
requires a mop-up of outstanding equity and front-loaded equity buyback costs 
may be hundreds of millions, or even billions, of dollars. There will often be 
pressure from stakeholders to not engage in such a buyback-like transaction, 
unless current holders of equity see little upside to holding the stock and inter-
est rates are predictably and persistently low. See Marvin Dumon, Why Public 
Companies Go Private, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/articles 
/stocks/08/public-companies-privatize-go-private.asp [https://perma.cc/9Y9W 
-L266] (explaining that mutualization requires large amounts of cash which is 
similar to the type of financing needed for a privatization transaction). 
100 See Olsen, supra note 79, at 367–68. 
101 See Update on Mutual Holding Companies, supra note 48, at 12, 13. 
102 See Daily, supra note 94. 
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may undergo a managerial transition for several fiscal quarters 
while being unable to defend itself from takeover during that time. 
CONCLUSION 
 The reasons for demutualization’s popularity are relatively 
clear—capital is substantially more plentiful and affordable for 
companies with stock company or stock-company-like forms.103 
Companies like mutuals, not-for-profit companies (which by law 
cannot pay dividends), and other more unusual forms generally 
are penalized with a cost of capital that exceeds, sometimes by a 
multiple, that of stock company and mutual holding company 
peers.104 
 At the same time as this difference in cost of capital is stark 
as ever, the capital requirements of businesses have increased 
markedly.105 Running a large-scale commodities trading floor or 
stock exchange in the modern age costs billions of dollars per 
year.106 A single hailstorm in Colorado can cost a property and 
casualty insurer a billion dollars.107 It is not unusual for a hospital 
system to have an operating budget in the hundreds of millions or 
billions of dollars.108 These are all businesses that have, at differ-
ent points in history, been predominantly organized as mutuals. 
 We suggest the trend toward demutualization will con-
tinue as capital markets will continue to favor entities with stock 
company or stock-company-like forms that are familiar to analysts, 
are seen as more transparent and orthodox in their reporting, and 
                                                                                                            
103 See Smallenberger, supra note 61, at 521. 
104 Id. 
105 Yalman Onaran, Capital Requirements, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 9, 2017, 1:48 
PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/banks-leverage-capital-ratios [https:// 
perma.cc/CDA7-7SDQ]. 
106 See, e.g., What is the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX)?, CORP. 
FIN. INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/trading 
-investing/new-york-mercantile-exchange-nymex/ [https://perma.cc/L4NP-3738]. 
107 May 8 Hail Storm Breaks Records At $1.4 Billion in Damage, CBS DENVER 
(May 23, 2017, 11:14 AM), http://denver.cbslocal.com/2017/05/23/hail-storm-may-8 
-insurance/ [https://perma.cc/9RZK-QMTY]. 
108 See, e.g., A Look at Our Books: Fiscal Year 2015 Capital Budget and An-
nual Operating Plan, JOHNS HOPKINS MED., https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org 
/news/publications/_docs/operating_capital_budget_infographic.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/4H7W-WJZV]. 
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can move quickly to acquire rivals or expand into adjacent market 
spaces.109 We further predict that mutuals will not perish, but will 
only persist in areas like insurance, farm cooperatives, niche ex-
changes, and community banking where the demutualization 
transaction itself is seen as too risky, too costly, or subjects the 
enterprise to unbearable takeover risk.110 
                                                                                                            
109 See Update on Mutual Holding Companies, supra note 48, at 2. 
110 See Daily, supra note 94. 
